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Abstract
Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of tax evasion and corruption in deter-
mining the size of fiscal multipliers. We introduce these two features in a New Keynesian
model and revisit the effects of fiscal consolidations. VAR evidence for Italy suggests that
spending cuts reduce tax evasion, while tax hikes increase it. In the model, spending cuts
induce a reallocation of production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion.
Tax hikes increase the incentives to produce in the less productive shadow sector, imply-
ing higher output and unemployment losses. Corruption further amplifies these losses by
requiring larger hikes in taxes to reduce debt. We use the model to assess the recent fiscal
consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Our results corroborate the evi-
dence of increasing levels of tax evasion during these consolidations and point to significant
output and welfare losses, which could be reduced substantially by combating tax evasion
and corruption.
1. Introduction
When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the
same amount of income. Plato, The Republic, Book I, 343-D
The recent fiscal crisis has sparked a considerable amount of research measuring the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidations.4 This literature, however, has left aside two
crucial political economy aspects, namely the presence of tax evasion and corruption. This
is surprising, given that they are important features in many of the countries adopting
consolidation policies, as seen in Figure 1. In addition, there is growing evidence that tax
evasion and corruption have increased in recent years. For example, a recent report by the
technical staff of the Spanish Finance Ministry (Gestha, 2014) indicates that the shadow
economy in Spain increased by 6.8 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, reaching
24.6% of GDP. At the same time, a special Greek police task force reported in 2013 that
∗Corresponding author
1Email address: evi.pappa@eui.eu, Telephone number: +39 055 4685908
2Email address: rana.sajedi@eui.eu
3Email address: eugenia.vella@eui.eu
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the number of cases of public corruption increased by 33% between 2011 and 2012.5 The
aim of this paper is to revisit the effects of government expenditure cuts and labor tax
hikes on output, unemployment and welfare, when tax evasion and corruption are present.
We treat tax evasion as synonymous with the shadow economy, which, according to
Buehn and Schneider (2012, p.175-176), comprises “all market-based, lawful production or
trade of goods and services deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to evade
either payment of income, value added or other taxes, or social security contributions”.
Fiscal policy has an impact on the size of the shadow economy since it affects the incentives
to tax evade both directly, through the tax burden, and indirectly, through its effects on
the formal economy. Thus, a fiscal consolidation can have important secondary effects if it
generates a reallocation of resources between the formal and informal sectors.6 Corruption,
in our paper, refers to the embezzlement of public funds. The presence of corruption can
hamper the ability of the government to raise revenue, and thus distort the effects of
fiscal consolidations. Tax evasion and corruption often coexist and possibly interact. For
instance, Buehn and Schneider (2012) indicate that there is a positive correlation between
the two.
Many authors have studied whether it is preferable to rely on spending cuts or tax
hikes when consolidating the public deficit. Overall, the findings are not conclusive. Using
multi-year fiscal consolidation data for 17 OECD countries over the period 1980-2005,
Alesina et al. (2013) show that expenditure-based adjustments are typically associated
with mild and short-lived recessions, and in some cases with no recession at all, while tax-
based corrections are followed by deep and prolonged recessions. On the other hand, Erceg
and Linde´ (2013) reach a different conclusion. Using a two-country Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model of a currency union, they show that, in the short run,
a spending cut depresses output by more than a labor tax hike, because of the limited
accommodation by the central bank and the fixed exchange rate. However, this is reversed
in the long run as real interest and exchange rates adjust towards their flexible price levels.
Indeed, there is strong evidence that the effects of fiscal consolidations are not yet fully
understood. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) examine the impact of the recent fiscal consoli-
dations in 26 OECD countries. They regress the forecast errors of output growth between
2010-2011 on the planned consolidation of public deficit, and find that the forecasts under-
estimate the size of fiscal multipliers. As shown in the next section, the underestimation of
fiscal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with a higher level of tax evasion and/or
corruption, suggesting that these two features amplify the effects of fiscal consolidations.
Reliable time series data on tax evasion is typically hard to get. Luckily, the Italian
5See http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/02/greek-police-public-worker-corruption-soars/
6For example, using a model calibrated to firm-level data for Greece, Pappada` and Zylberberg (2014)
show that the increase in tax evasion can explain three quarters of the revenue leakages following the 2010
VAT hikes, when only half of the expected increase in revenue was realized. Colombo et al. (2014) also
show empirical evidence of a rise in the shadow economy in recent years, although their focus is on the role
of the banking crisis.
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Figure 1: Shadow Economy and Corruption in European Countries
Shadow Economy (% GDP), Average over 1999-2010
Source: Schneider and Buehn (2012).
Control of Corruption Index, Average over 1998-2010
Source: World Bank Global Governance Indicators.
Note: The dotted line indicates the average for the countries considered.
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National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) has created and regularly updated a time series
of informal employment in Italy, which is consistent with international standards and,
in particular, with the 1993 System of National Accounts. Apart from data availability,
Italy is a fitting case for studying tax evasion and corruption. Firstly, there is abundant
evidence of a large shadow economy, with estimates varying between 15% and 30% of GDP
(see e.g. Ardizzi et al., 2012, Orsi et al., 2014, and Schneider and Buehn, 2012). Secondly,
Busato and Chiarini (2004) have shown that incorporating the shadow economy in an
RBC model for Italy considerably improves the fit to the data. Thirdly, Italy scores poorly
in international rankings of institutional quality: it is currently ranked 72nd among 176
countries with a score of 42/100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index and 25th among the 27 EU members in the index for the ‘Quality of Government’
(see Charron et al., 2012).7
In the first part of this paper, we incorporate the ISTAT series on informal employ-
ment in a VAR, and identify the effects of fiscal consolidations occurring through a fall
in government consumption expenditure or an increase in direct taxes. We find that both
types of shocks are contractionary, both reducing output and increasing unemployment.
However, tax hikes significantly increase informal employment, while spending cuts reduce
it.
To understand the mechanisms driving the results, we reassess the effects of fiscal
consolidations in a model with price stickiness, search and matching frictions, endogenous
labor force participation, tax evasion and corruption. The economy features a regular
and an informal sector, and the transactions in the latter sector are not recorded by the
government. Firms can hire informal labor to hide part of their production and evade
payroll taxes. Households may also evade personal income taxation by reallocating their
labor to the informal sector. In each period, there is a positive probability that irregular
employment is detected, in which case the worker loses the job and the firm pays a fine.
Corruption implies that a fraction of tax revenues is embezzled. Following Erceg and
Linde´ (2013), either labor tax rates or government consumption expenditures react to the
deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from a target value. Fiscal consolidation occurs when
this target is hit by a negative shock.
We find that the presence of tax evasion and corruption amplifies the negative effects
of labor tax hikes on output and unemployment, while it mitigates those of expenditure
cuts. Tax evasion and corruption imply that a larger increase in the tax rate is needed to
reduce debt, and this amplifies the distortionary effects of the consolidation. Tax evasion
further increases the output losses after a tax hike because workers and firms reallocate
resources to the informal sector, increasing inefficiencies since this sector is less productive.
On the other hand, government spending cuts reduce tax evasion. The spending cut
7The Corruption Perception Index is based on a cross-country survey assessing the degree of transparency
in public administration. The ‘Quality of Government’ index accounts for other pillars, such as protection
of the rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability, in addition to corruption.
4
creates a positive wealth effect which increases consumption and investment and reduces
labor force participation. Agents reallocate their labor search towards the formal sector,
first because it is more productive, and second because the formal labor market has a
higher matching efficiency and a lower job destruction rate. Hence, the share of shadow
employment in total employment is reduced. Relative to standard models, tax evasion
and corruption increase the size of this wealth effect, thereby increasing the crowding-in of
private consumption, and reducing output losses.
Labor tax hikes are costly in terms of welfare, but spending cuts typically involve
welfare gains, since private consumption increases and labor supply decreases. The latter
result is reversed, however, if government spending directly enters the utility of households,
or if agents are liquidity constrained.
We use our model to compare the recent consolidation policies in Greece, Italy, Spain
and Portugal, all countries that are characterized by both high corruption and tax evasion.
Despite the fact that the consolidation plans rely heavily on spending cuts, the model
predicts increasing levels of tax evasion in all countries, as well as prolonged recessions.
The largest output losses are observed in Portugal, due to the size of the tax hikes, and
Greece, due to the severity of the austerity measures. There are also substantial welfare
losses in all countries; the largest occurs in Portugal because of the significant tax hikes in
the consolidation package.
There have been considerable discussions in the policy arena about combating both
tax evasion and corruption. For example, members of the European Parliament organized
an event focusing on corruption and tax evasion in Ljubljana in May 2013. The issue of
reducing tax evasion also dominated the 2013 meeting of G8 leaders. To quantitatively
evaluate the welfare gains from fighting tax evasion and corruption, we perform a coun-
terfactual analysis of the consolidation plans when we reduce the degree of corruption and
tax evasion. We find that both battles are worth fighting as they significantly reduce the
welfare losses from fiscal consolidation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
empirical evidence to motivate our work. In Section 3 we develop the model and its
calibration. Section 4 discusses the main theoretical results. Section 5 presents the policy
comparisons and Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical Evidence
This section is divided into two parts. We first present evidence highlighting the impor-
tance of corruption and tax evasion in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. Here, we
extend the cross-country regressions of Blanchard and Leigh (2013), henceforth BL (2013),
controlling for tax evasion and public corruption, and we check the robustness of our con-
clusions by considering the output effects of narrative consolidation shocks. We then use
the ISTAT data on shadow employment to run VAR regressions examining the effects of
spending cuts and tax hikes on output, unemployment and shadow employment in Italy.
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2.1. Do Tax Evasion and Corruption Matter?
To motivate our study, we replicate the BL (2013) regressions, controlling for tax evasion
and public corruption. As a proxy for tax evasion we use the estimates of the share of
shadow output to total GDP provided by Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012), while for corruption
we use the Corruption Perception Index. We group the 26 European countries considered
by BL (2013) into either high and low tax evasion, or high and low corruption.8 We then
add to the BL (2013) regressions a dummy which is equal to one for the high corruption
or tax evasion group. We also run the same regression using a dummy for both high
corruption and tax evasion; in this case we drop three countries which do not fall into the
same group across the two indices.9
The results are shown in Table 1. The first column replicates the findings of BL (2013).
The planned fiscal consolidation variable is significant at 1% and has a coefficient of -1.095,
implying that “for every additional percentage point of fiscal consolidation as a percentage
of GDP, output was 1 percent lower than forecast” (BL, 2013, p.8). Thus, fiscal multipliers
are underestimated. Columns 2 to 4 show the results when we include the interaction of the
planned fiscal consolidation variable with our dummies for high tax evasion and corruption.
While the coefficient is still significant at 5% when the dummy variables are included, it
is lower in absolute value. On the other hand, the interaction term is always significant,
showing that there is a significant difference in the coefficients between the two groups.
Our estimates imply that the coefficient on the planned fiscal consolidation is -1.431 for
the high tax evasion group, -1.540 for the high corruption group, and -1.518 for the high
tax evasion and corruption group. In all cases, they are larger, in absolute value, than
the baseline results of BL (2013), indicating that the implicit underestimation of fiscal
multipliers is more pronounced in countries with higher tax evasion and/or corruption. In
other words, these two features amplify the effects of fiscal consolidations.
The BL (2013) methodology has been criticized in a number of ways. Of particular
importance for our study is the fact that the regression may not truly capture the effect of
fiscal multipliers on forecast errors. Given that the forecasts are conditional not only on
fiscal shocks but on the full set of information used by the forecaster, forecast errors may
depend on factors other than underestimated fiscal multipliers.
8We use a two-mean clustering algorithm to endogenously group the countries. The resulting ‘high
tax evasion’ group comprises Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia and Spain, while the ‘low tax evasion’ group includes Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia and the
UK. The ‘high corruption’ group comprises Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, while the ‘low corruption’ group includes
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK.
9An alternative way of carrying out this analysis would be to include the indices as controls in the
regression. We have chosen to use the dummy variable approach because, although we have robust groupings
of countries in terms of high and low tax evasion and corruption, there is not enough cross-sectional variation
in either index to add them directly in the regression, and also to avoid issues of generated regressor bias,
since both measures are estimates of the underlying variables of interest.
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Table 1: Blanchard and Leigh (2013) Regressions with Additional Controls, Dependent Variable: Forecast Error of GDP growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
REGRESSORS (Baseline)
Planned Fiscal Consolidation -1.095*** -0.670** -0.550** -0.618** -1.326*** -1.003** -1.095*** -1.400** -0.924***
(0.255) (0.268) (0.259) (0.268) (0.152) (0.349) (0.261) (0.562) (0.301)
Interaction with:
High Tax Evasion -0.761**
(0.351)
High Corruption -0.990***
(0.333)
High Tax Evasion -0.900**
and Corruption (0.351)
Poorly Functioning 0.511
Financial System (0.419)
High Slack -0.181
in Economy (0.517)
Large Fiscal -0.064
Consolidation (0.570)
High Sovereign 0.385
Debt (0.614)
High Sovereign -0.253
Debt Risk (0.445)
Constant 0.775* 0.918** 0.964** 0.925* 0.727* 0.820* 0.777* 0.781* 0.828*
(0.383) (0.414) (0.415) (0.450) (0.383) (0.416) (0.404) (0.400) (0.401)
Observations 26 26 26 23 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.496 0.557 0.600 0.607 0.525 0.499 0.496 0.507 0.501
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗p ≤ 0.1
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In order to check whether the results we obtain are due to the particular methodology of
BL (2013), we perform a different exercise using the narrative fiscal consolidation episodes
identified by Devries et al. (2011) for a group of OECD countries. As above, we separate the
sample of countries into high and low tax evasion and high and low corruption groups.10 We
then calculate the output responses to both expenditure-based and tax-based consolidations
for each group by estimating an empirical model similar to Alesina et al. (2013). The
results are shown in Figure 2. Tax evasion and corruption do not appear to significantly
affect the response of output to expenditure-based consolidations, although the high tax
evasion group has slightly lower output losses in the long run. In the case of tax-based
consolidations, the output effects for high tax evasion and corruption countries are lower on
impact, but significantly larger and more prolonged in the medium and long run. Hence,
even with this alternative methodology, we find that tax evasion and corruption affect the
size of fiscal multipliers, and amplify the output losses from tax adjustments in particular.
There is an important caveat to the exercises we have shown above, specifically that we
could be omitting other factors which are common across the groups. In other words, the
effects which we capture could be driven by other country characteristics that are correlated
with tax evasion and corruption. To address this issue, we have attempted to control for
several of the potential omitted factors. Columns 5 to 9 of Table 1 show the results of
the BL (2013) regressions controlling for: i) sophistication of financial systems, ii) degree
of slack in the economy, iii) size of the fiscal consolidation, iv) level of sovereign debt and
v) level of sovereign risk.11 We see that none of these controls can explain the results we
had previously found. We have also carried out the same robustness checks for the second
exercise shown above using the narrative fiscal consolidation episodes, and again we do not
find that any of these controls can account for the differences we observe between countries
with high and low tax evasion and corruption.12 Whilst we cannot make causal statements
from these results, we can clearly see that countries with high tax evasion or corruption
have higher fiscal multipliers, and that this is not driven by five of the most likely potential
omitted factors.
We also run regressions for the components of GDP, and for unemployment, to under-
stand which variables are more significantly affected by the presence of these two features.
The results are shown in the online appendix.13 We find that the presence of corruption and
tax evasion is particularly important for the effects of consolidations on the unemployment
10In this case, the ‘high tax evasion’ group consists of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain,
whilst the ‘low tax evasion’ group consists of Australia, Austria, France, the UK and the US. The ‘high
corruption’ group consists of France, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain, and the ‘low corruption’ group
consists of Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
11These are measured by i) the household debt-to-income ratio, ii) the unemployment rate, iii) the
reduction in the structural deficit, where, following Alesina and Ardagna (2010), a consolidation is large if
the deficit was reduced by more than 1.5% GDP, iv) the government debt-to-GDP level and v) the sovereign
credit default swap spread, respectively.
12These results are available from the authors upon request.
13The online appendix is available at: http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Pappa/
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Figure 2: Output Responses to Narrative Consolidation Episodes
(a) High and Low Tax Evasion Groups
(b) High and Low Corruption Groups
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Table 2: Baseline Sign Restrictions
Variable: Govt Expenditure Tax Revenue Debt
Shock: t = 0, 1, 2 t = 0, 1, 2 t = 1, 2, 3
Spending Cut – n/a –
Tax Hike n/a + –
rate and investment, but not for consumption, exports or imports.
2.2. Do Fiscal Consolidations Affect Tax Evasion?
The Italian statistical office provides estimates of the number of employees working in
the informal sector using the discrepancies between reported employment from household
surveys and firm surveys (see ISTAT, 2010). We use the share of informal workers in total
workers as a measure of the size of the shadow economy, and enter this variable into a VAR
to ascertain the effect of fiscal consolidations using different instruments.
To identify the effects of unexpected spending cuts, we run a VAR with GDP (or the
unemployment rate), government final consumption expenditures, government debt and
the share of informal workers in total workers as endogenous variables, and tax revenues as
an exogenous variable. We use sign restrictions to identify a negative shock to government
expenditure which lasts for 3 periods, and reduces debt with a lag. To identify the effects
of unexpected labor tax hikes, we run a similar VAR which includes direct tax revenues as
an endogenous variable and government expenditures as an exogenous control. We again
use sign restrictions to identify a positive shock to tax revenues, lasting 3 periods, which
reduces debt with a lag. The responses of all other variables are left unrestricted. The sign
restrictions used are summarized in Table 2.
We use annual data from 1980-2006. Except for the ISTAT series, all data is taken from
the AMECO database of the European Commission.14 All fiscal variables are expressed
as a ratio to GDP, and we include time trends and dummies for the start of the European
Monetary Union, and for the mid-90s since there is a break in the debt series. We include
one lag in the VAR, and also include interest rates as an exogenous variable in order to
control for the effects of monetary policy. Given the small sample size, we estimate the
VAR with Bayesian methods and present 68% posterior confidence bands.
The first panel of Figure 3 shows the resulting IRFs for the spending shocks, and Figure
4 shows the results for the tax shock.15 After an expenditure cut, output decreases signif-
icantly at all horizons, while shadow employment falls significantly on impact. Following
14The ISTAT data is available from http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39522.
15For ease of exposition we show only the responses of the unrestricted variables in each case, and show
only the shadow employment response in the VAR specification with GDP; the other responses are in line
with the sign restrictions imposed, and the response of shadow employment is similar in all cases. The full
results are presented in the online appendix.
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Figure 3: Empirical IRFs - Expenditure Shock
GDP Shadow Employment Unemployment Rate
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(c) Cholesky Decomposition
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Figure 4: Empirical IRFs - Tax Shock
GDP Shadow Employment Unemployment Rate
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(c) Cholesky Decomposition
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a tax hike, output does not fall on impact but the response is significantly negative in the
medium run, and there is a significant rise in shadow employment on impact. When the
unemployment rate is used instead of output, we see that it rises significantly after both
types of consolidation.
The correct identification of fiscal shocks is highly contested in the literature, and there
are justifiable concerns regarding the robustness of VAR results to different identification
schemes. To demonstrate the robustness of our qualitative results, we examine their sen-
sitivity to alternative identification schemes. The second panel of Figures 3 and 4 present
responses when we use an alternative set of sign restrictions in which we jointly identify
spending cuts and tax hikes in the same VAR regression, by assuming that they are un-
correlated. The final panel presents results when we use a simple Cholesky decomposition
to identify the shocks, ordering government spending and tax revenues first in the system.
Whilst the precise pattern of the responses can differ, the result broadly remains that con-
solidations are contractionary, and that spending-based consolidations reduce tax evasion
whilst tax-based consolidations increase it. Since the zero restrictions imposed in both the
alternative sign restrictions and the Cholesky are unlikely to hold in annual data, and we
are restricted to using annual data due to the availability of data on shadow employment,
we feel that our baseline sign restrictions are the most valid choice.16
Another potential problem with the SVAR methodology is whether the shocks we have
identified can be anticipated. Dealing comprehensively with this issue is not straightfor-
ward, and is beyond the scope of this paper. As a first pass at ascertaining whether the
shocks we have identified are truly unanticipated, we follow Perotti (2005) and regress
the spending shocks, identified in our baseline sign restrictions, on forecast errors from
professional forecasts of government expenditure, taken from the ECB’s survey of profes-
sional forecasts. The first column of Table 3 shows the results from regressions using the
“raw” forecast errors, and the second column shows the results using the residuals after
regressing the forecast errors on the lag of the 4 variables in the VAR. We see that in both
cases, the forecast errors are uncorrelated to our shocks, suggesting that our shocks are
not predictable.
Thus the data robustly suggests that fiscal consolidation through expenditure cuts
leads to a fall in shadow employment, while a consolidation through tax hikes increases
shadow employment, and that both types of consolidations are contractionary. In the next
section we develop a model with tax evasion and corruption to replicate these findings and
understand how these frictions affect the propagation of fiscal shocks.
16We have also used the narrative fiscal consolidation episodes identified by Devries et al. (2011), however,
given that they provide very few episodes for Italy alone, we do not find significant responses. Further details
of all these exercises are provided in the online appendix.
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Table 3: Anticipated Shocks
Dependent Variable: VAR Expenditure Shocks
REGRESSOR 1 2
‘Raw’ Professional 0.006
Forecast Errors (0.005)
‘Purified’ Professional -.001
Forecast Errors (0.005)
Constant 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
R-squared 0.091 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗p ≤ 0.1
3. The Model
We construct a DSGE model featuring search and matching frictions, endogenous labor
decisions, and sticky prices in the short run. Since, in Section 2, we found that corruption
and tax evasion are not important for the effects of fiscal consolidation on exports or
imports, we consider a closed economy. There are two types of firms in the economy: (i)
competitive firms that produce intermediate goods in either the formal or informal sector,
and (ii) monopolistic retailers that use all intermediate varieties to produce differentiated
retail goods, which are then costlessly aggregated into a final consumption good. Price
rigidities arise at the retail level, while labor market frictions occur in the production of
intermediate goods. Intermediate firms can choose to produce in the informal sector in
order to evade the payroll taxes paid on formal employment. In each period, they face a
probability of being inspected by the fiscal authorities and convicted of tax evasion, in which
case they pay a penalty, and the employment match is terminated. There is a representative
household consisting of formal and informal employees, unemployed jobseekers and labor
force non-participants. Jobseekers can choose to search in the informal sector in order
to evade income taxes. The household rents out its private capital to the intermediate
firms, and purchases the final consumption good. The government collects taxes from the
regular sector, embezzles a fraction of the revenues, and uses the remainder to finance
public expenditures and the provision of unemployment benefits.
3.1. Labor markets
We account for the imperfections and transaction costs in the labor market by assuming
that jobs are created through a matching function. For j = F, I denoting the formal and
informal sectors, let υjt be the number of vacancies and u
j
t the number of jobseekers in each
14
sector. We assume matching functions of the form:
mjt = µ
j
1(υ
j
t )
µ2(ujt )
1−µ2 (1)
where we allow for differences in the efficiency of the matching process, µj1, in the two
sectors. In each sector we can define the probability of a jobseeker being hired, ψhjt , and
of a vacancy being filled, ψfjt , as follows:
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
, ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
In each period, jobs in the formal sector are destroyed at a constant fraction, σF , and mFt
new matches are formed. The law of motion of formal employment, nFt , is thus given by:
nFt+1 = (1− σ
F )nFt +m
F
t (2)
In the informal sector there is an exogenous fraction of jobs destroyed in each period, σI ,
as well as a probability, ρ, that an informal employee loses their job due to an audit. The
law of motion of informal employment, nIt , is given by:
nIt+1 = (1− ρ− σ
I)nIt +m
I
t (3)
3.2. Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The
members of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of
members that are out of the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, cct, defined as:
cct = [α1(ct)
α2 + (1− α1)(gt)
α2 ]
1
α2
where gt denotes public consumption, taken as exogenous by the household, and ct is
private consumption. The elasticity of substitution between the private and public goods
is given by 11−α2 .
17 The instantaneous utility function is given by:
U(cct, lt) =
cc1−ηt
1− η
+Φ
l1−ϕt
1− ϕ
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Φ > 0 is the relative
preference for leisure, and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
At any point in time, a fraction nFt (n
I
t ) of the household members are formal (informal)
employees. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014), Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2012) and Bermperoglou
et al. (2014) have added a labor force participation choice in New Keynesian models of
equilibrium unemployment. Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modelled
17When α2 approaches one, ct and gt are perfect substitutes. They are instead perfect complements if
α2 tends to minus infinity. α2 = 0 nests the Cobb-Douglas specification.
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as a trade-off between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of finding a job. In
particular, the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a
job, ut, and the fraction which are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt, so that:
nFt + n
I
t + ut + lt = 1 (4)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st of job-
seekers look for a job in the informal sector, while the remainder, (1−st), seek employment
in the formal sector. That is, uIt ≡ stut and u
F
t ≡ (1− st)ut.
The household owns the capital stock, which evolves over time according to:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt −
ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt (5)
where it is investment, δ is a constant depreciation rate and
ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt are adjustment
costs.
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
(1 + τ ct )ct + it +
Bt+1πt+1
Rt
≤ rtkt + (1− τ
n
t )w
F
t n
F
t +w
I
t n
I
t +̟u
F
t +Bt +Π
p
t − Tt (6)
where πt ≡ pt/pt−1 is the gross inflation rate, w
j
t , j = F, I, are the real wages in the
two sectors, rt is the real return on capital, ̟ denotes unemployment benefits, available
only to formal jobseekers (see e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007), Bt is the real government
bond holdings, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Π
p
t are the profits of the monopolistic
retailers, discussed below, and τ ct , τ
n
t and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, labor
income and lump-sum taxes respectively.
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility subject to (1) for each j, (2), (3),
(4), (5), and (6). Taking as given njt , they choose ut, st (which together determine lt) and
njt+1, as well as ct, kt+1 and Bt+1.
It is convenient to define the marginal value to the household of having an additional
member employed in each sector, as follows:
V hnF t = λctw
F
t (1− τ
n
t )− Φl
−ϕ
t + (1− σ
F )λnF t (7)
V hnI t = λctw
I
t − Φl
−ϕ
t + (1− ρ− σ
I)λnI t (8)
where λnF t, λnI t and λct are the multipliers in front of (2), (3) and (6) respectively.
18
18The first order conditions of the household’s problem and the derivations of equations (7) and (8) are
presented in the online appendix.
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3.3. Production
3.3.1. Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with two different technologies:
xFt = (A
F
t n
F
t )
1−αF (kt)
αF
xIt = (A
I
tn
I
t )
1−αI
where Ajt denotes total factor productivity in sector j. Following the literature, we as-
sume that the informal production technology uses labor inputs only (see e.g. Busato and
Chiarini, 2004).
Firms maximize the discounted value of future profits, subject to (2) and (3). That is,
they take the number of workers currently employed in each sector, njt , as given and choose
the number of vacancies posted in each sector, υjt , so as to employ the desired number
of workers next period, njt+1. Here, firms adjust employment by varying the number of
workers (extensive margin) rather than the number of hours per worker (intensive margin).
According to Hansen (1985), most of the employment fluctuations arise from movements
in this margin. Firms also decide the amount of private capital, kt, needed for production.
They face a probability, ρ, of being inspected by the fiscal authorities, convicted of tax
evasion and forced to pay a penalty, which is a fraction, γ, of their total revenues. We
assume that, once they are produced, there is no differentiation between intermediate
goods from the different sectors. In other words, we assume that formal and informal
goods are perfect substitutes, so that they are sold at the same price, pxt (see e.g. Orsi
et al., 2014). Hence the problem of an intermediate firm is summarized by the following
Bellman equation:
Q(nFt , n
I
t ) = max
kt,υ
F
t ,υ
I
t
{
(1− ργ) pxt (x
F
t + x
I
t )− (1 + τ
s
t )w
F
t n
F
t − w
I
t n
I
t − rtkt
− κFυFt − κ
IυIt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Q(n
F
t+1, n
I
t+1)
] }
where τ st is a payroll tax, κ
j is the cost of posting a new vacancy in sector j, and Λt,t+1 ≡
β
Ucc,t+1
Ucc,t
= β
(
cct+1
cct
)
−η
is a discount factor. The first-order conditions are:
rt = (1− ργ) p
x
t
(
αFxFt
kt
)
(9)
κF
ψfFt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ργ) pxt+1(1− α
F )
xFt+1
nFt+1
− (1 + τ st+1)w
F
t+1 +
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt+1
]
(10)
κI
ψfIt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ργ) pxt+1(1− α
I)
xIt+1
nIt+1
− wIt+1 +
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt+1
]
(11)
According to (9)-(11), the net value of the marginal product of private capital should
equal the real rental rate and the expected marginal cost of hiring a worker in each sector
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j should equal the expected marginal benefit. The latter includes the net value of the
marginal product of labor minus the wage, augmented by the payroll tax in the formal
sector, plus the continuation value.
For convenience, we define the value of the marginal formal and informal job for the
intermediate firm:
V f
nF t
= (1− ργ) pxt (1− α
F )
xFt
nFt
− (1 + τ st )w
F
t +
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt
(12)
V f
nI t
= (1− ργ) pxt (1− α
I)
xIt
nIt
− wIt +
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt
(13)
3.3.2. Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technology
that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and thus the
relative price of intermediate goods, pxt , coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the
retailers. Let yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The final consumption good
can be expressed as:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
(yit)
ǫ−1
ǫ di
] ǫ
ǫ−1
where ǫ > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The final good is sold
at a price pt =
[∫ 1
0 p
1−ǫ
it di
] 1
1−ǫ
. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its
relative price and on aggregate demand:
yit =
(
pit
pt
)
−ǫ
yt
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price
with a fixed probability (1− χ). Hence, the price index is given by:
pt =
[
(1− χ)(p∗t )
1−ǫ + χ(pt−1)
1−ǫ
] 1
1−ǫ (14)
Firms that are able to reset their price choose p∗it so as to maximize expected profits given
by:
Et
∞∑
s=0
χsΛt,t+s(p
∗
it − p
x
t+s)yit+s
The resulting expression for p∗it is:
p∗it =
ǫ
ǫ− 1
Et
∑
∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+sp
x
t+syit+s
Et
∑
∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+syit+s
(15)
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3.4. Government
Government expenditure consists of consumption purchases and unemployment bene-
fits, while revenues come from the collected fines and the payroll, consumption, and labor
income taxes, as well as the lump-sum taxes. The government deficit is therefore defined
by:
DFt = gt +̟u
F
t − (1− ξ
TR)TRt − ργp
x
t (x
F
t + x
I
t )
where TRt ≡ (τ
n
t + τ
s
t )w
F
t n
F
t + τ
c
t ct+Tt denotes tax revenues and ξ
TR ∈ [0, 1) denotes the
embezzlement rate in the presence of corruption in the economy.
The government budget constraint is given by:
Bt +DFt = R
−1
t Bt+1πt+1
We assume that Tt, τ
s
t , and τ
c
t are constant and fixed at their steady state levels, and
we do not consider them as active instruments for fiscal consolidation. In our model,
the effects of payroll taxes are very similar to labor income taxes. Consumption taxes
can have different effects, but they generally constitute a relatively small source of tax
revenues. Thus, in line with Erceg and Linde´ (2013), the government has two potential
fiscal instruments, g and τn. We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one
is active, the other remains fixed at its steady state value. For Ψ ∈ {g, τn}, we assume
fiscal rules of the form:
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0)ΨβΨ0t−1 exp{(1− βΨ0)[βΨ1(bt − b
∗
t ) + βΨ2(∆bt+1 −∆b
∗
t+1)]}
where bt =
Bt
yt
is the debt-to-GDP ratio, and b∗t is the target value for this ratio, given by
the AR(2) process:
log b∗t+1 − log b
∗
t = µb + ρ1(log b
∗
t − log b
∗
t−1)− ρ2 log b
∗
t − ε
b
t
where εbt is a white noise shock representing a fiscal consolidation.
3.5. Closing the model
Monetary Policy. There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nominal in-
terest rate as a function of current inflation according to the rule:
Rt = R exp{ζπ(πt − 1)}
where R is the steady state value of the nominal interest rate.
Goods Markets. Total output must equal private and public demand. The aggregate re-
source constraint is thus given by:
yt = ct + it + gt + κ
FυFt + κ
IυIt + ξ
TRTRt
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where the last term is the resource cost of corruption in the economy.19
The aggregate price index, pt, is given by (14) and (15). The return on private capital,
rt, adjusts so that the capital demanded by the intermediate goods firm, given by (9), is
equal to the stock held by the household.
Bargaining over wages. Wages in both sectors are determined by ex-post (after matching)
Nash bargaining. Workers and firms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive
depends on their bargaining power. We denote by ϑj ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining power in
sector j. The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
w
j
t
{
(1− ϑj) log V hnjt + ϑ
j log V f
njt
}
where V h
njt
and V f
njt
are defined in equations (7), (8), (12) and (13). As shown in the online
appendix, wages are given by:
wFt =
(1− ϑF )
(1 + τ st )
(
(1− ργ) pxt (1− α
F )
xFt
nFt
+
(1− σF )κF
ψfFt
)
+
ϑF
λct(1− τnt )
(
Φl−ϕt −(1−σ
F )λnF t
)
wIt = (1−ϑ
I)
(
(1− ργ) pxt (1− α
I)
xIt
nIt
+
(1− ρ− σI)κI
ψfIt
)
+
ϑI
λct
(
Φl−ϕt −(1−ρ−σ
I)λnI t
)
3.6. Calibrating the Model
We calibrate the model using annual Italian data for the period 1982-2006.20 Table
4 displays the values used. We calibrate the labor force participation and unemployment
rate in the formal sector to match the observed average values. Thus, we set official labor
force participation, lf ≡ nF +uF , equal to 60% and the official unemployment rate to 10%.
We fix the separation rate σF = 0.07. We set the probability of filling a vacancy in the
formal sector ψfF = 0.96, and the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies µ2 = 0.7,
which is close to the estimate obtained in Peracchi and Viviano (2004).
The capital depreciation rate, δ, is set equal to 0.088. Following the literature, we set
the discount factor β = 0.96. The elasticity of demand for retail goods, ǫ, is set such that
the gross steady state markup, ǫ
ǫ−1 , is equal to 1.25, and the price of the final good is
normalized to one. The TFP parameter in the formal sector, AF , is normalized to one,
and the capital share αF = 0.36. We set the vacancy costs in the formal sector κF = 0.14,
and the payroll tax rate τ s = 16%, close to the value used in Orsi et al. (2014).
In the informal sector, we assume that TFP is lower than the formal sector by setting
AI = 0.6. According to Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), the fact that the informal sector has
restricted access to credit leads to fewer resources being devoted to research and develop-
ment, or to absorbing technology spillovers, which in turn reduces productivity. Also, both
19See the online appendix for full derivations.
20Details of the calibration exercise are in the online appendix.
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Table 4: Baseline Calibration Values
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.96
δ Depreciation Rate 0.088
α1 Share of Private Consumption in Utility 1
η Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 2
ϕ Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 2
Φ Relative Utility from Leisure 0.7
lf Official Labor Force Participation 0.6
uF
lf
Official Unemployment Rate 0.1
u
1−l Actual Unemployment Rate 0.09
s Share of Informal Jobseekers to Total 0.10
nI
n
Share of Informal Employment to Total 0.13
σF Exogenous Job Destruction Rate - Formal Sector 0.07
σI Exogenous Job Destruction Rate - Informal Sector 0.0545
ρ Auditing Probability 0.02
µF1 Matching Efficiency - Formal Sector 0.85
µI1 Matching Efficiency - Informal Sector 0.12
µ2 Elasticity of Matching to Vacancies 0.7
ψfF Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Formal Sector 0.96
ψfI Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Informal Sector 0.05
ψhF Probability of Finding a Job - Formal Sector 0.63
ψhI Probability of Finding a Job - Informal Sector 0.91
AF TFP - Formal Sector 1
AI TFP - Informal Sector 0.6
αF Capital Share - Formal Sector 0.36
αI Production Function Parameter - Informal Sector 0.4
yI
y
Share of Underground Output in Total 0.16
κF Vacancy Costs - Formal Sector 0.14
κF
wF
Vacancy Costs/Wage 0.21
κI Vacancy Costs - Informal Sector 0.13
ǫ Price Elasticity of Demand 5
ϑF Firm’s Bargaining Power - Formal Sector 0.22
ϑI Firm’s Bargaining Power - Informal Sector 0.80
wI
wF
Formal/Informal Wage Differentials 0.98
g
y
Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 0.11
̟
wF
Replacement Rate 0.35
τn Labor Income Tax Rate 0.4
τ s Payroll Tax Rate 0.16
τ c Consumption Tax Rate 0.18
γ Proportional Fine in Case of Auditing 0.3
ξTR Embezzlement Rate 0.2
DF
y
Deficit-to-GDP Ratio -0.04
b Debt-to-GDP Ratio 1.03
ρ1, ρ2 Debt-to-GDP Target Parameters 0.85, 0.0001
χ Price Stickiness 0.25
ω Capital Adjustment Costs 0.5
ζπ Taylor Rule Parameter 1.5
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Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Orsi et al. (2014) emphasize empirical evidence suggesting
that the workers in the informal sector have lower education levels.21
Using the ISTAT data, we set the share of informal employment to total employment
equal to 0.13, and we set αI = 0.4, implying the share of shadow output to total output
yI
y
= 16%. We set the exogenous job destruction rate in the informal sector σI = 0.0545,
the probability of filling a vacancy in the informal sector ψfI = 0.05, and the vacancy cost
in the informal sector κI = 0.13. These values yield a relatively small wage premium for
the formal sector, w
I
wF
= 0.98, in line with the literature. The probability of audit and the
fraction of total revenues paid as a fine in the event of an audit are set as follows: ρ = 0.02,
close to the value used in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), and γ = 0.3. For the probability
of tax audit, we also consider alternative values (ρ = 0.04 and ρ = 0.01) in the sensitivity
analysis.
We set the replacement rate ̟
wF
= 0.35, close to the estimates in Martin (1996), and
used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004). Government spending as a share of GDP and the
remaining tax rates are set as follows: g
y
= 11%, τn = 40%, in line with Orsi et al.
(2014), and τ c = 18%. The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio b = 103%. Regarding the
embezzlement parameter, we set ξTR = 0.2 and study the sensitivity of our results to
different values of this parameter.
We begin by assuming purely wasteful government expenditure, setting α1 = 1, and
will consider utility enhancing government spending as an extension. Regarding the inverse
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, η, much of the literature cites the econometric
estimates of Hansen and Singleton (1983), which place it “between 0 and 2”, and often
choose a value greater than unity. In our calibration, we set η = 2 and we perform
sensitivity analysis by considering η equal to 0.5 and 1. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity,
ϕ, is set equal to 2 and we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in this parameter.
Finally, we set the inflation targeting parameter in the Taylor rule ζπ = 1.5, the capital
adjustment costs ω = 0.5 and the price-stickiness parameter χ = 0.25.
4. Results
We present responses following a negative debt-target shock (following Erceg and Linde´,
2013). We compare the effects of a 5% reduction in the desired long run debt target, which
is achieved after 10 years, either through a fall in government consumption expenditure,
or a hike in labor tax rates.22
4.1. Dynamics in a Model without Tax Evasion and Corruption
As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the responses of a standard model where tax
evasion and corruption are absent, shown in Figure 5.
21Orsi et al. (2014) also note the equivalence of assuming lower productivity in the informal sector to
assuming a cost for concealing production.
22For comparison purposes, throughout this section we adjust the parameters of the policy rules for each
case to ensure that the debt target is met after 10 years.
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Figure 5: IRFs of Benchmark Model (without Tax Evasion and Corruption)
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A consolidation carried out through a fall in government spending has two effects.
Firstly, there is a negative demand effect for firms, which leads, in the presence of nominal
rigidities, to a fall in labor demand and hence in vacancies. Second, there is a positive
wealth effect for the household, which increases consumption and investment and reduces
labor force participation. Given the drop in both labor demand and supply, employment
falls and the wage rate rises. Output falls in the short run, but increases in the medium and
long run because investment, and hence the capital stock, increases. The unemployment
rate reflects movements in the number of jobseekers: it falls on impact, but then increases
as employment and wages adjust.
When the fiscal consolidation is carried out through a labor tax hike, there is a negative
wealth effect for the household which makes consumption fall, and investment fall with a
lag. However, as the return from employment falls, there is a substitution effect which
outweighs the wealth effect, and leads to a decrease in labor force participation. The fall in
private demand induces firms to contract their labor demand, again expressed through a
drop in vacancies. Employment and output fall, and the responses are significantly larger
and more persistent than in the case of spending cuts, due to the fall in investment.
Thus, our benchmark model seems to be consistent with the evidence of Alesina et al.
(2013): spending cuts are accompanied by mild and short-lived recessions, while tax hikes
lead to more prolonged and deep recessions.
4.2. Dynamics in a Model with Corruption
Next, we study how the responses change when we introduce embezzlement of public
funds in our model, shown in Figure 6. In our baseline calibration we set the embezzlement
rate ξTR = 0.2.
The introduction of corruption does not alter the responses of the economy qualitatively.
In the case of government spending cuts, the effects are negligible. However, in the case
of labor tax rate hikes, there are notable quantitative differences. Given that a fraction of
tax revenues are now lost through embezzlement, the change in the tax rates required to
achieve debt consolidation is larger. This leads to an amplification of the effects observed
in all variables.
We also check the sensitivity of this effect to the embezzlement rate. Informal accounts
suggest that there are often large rents to be obtained in less developed economies, although
precise estimates are difficult to obtain. Krueger (1974) estimates rents generated by
import licenses alone to be in the range of 15% of GNP for Turkey in 1968; similarly
large estimates are obtained by Gallagher (1991) for a sample of African countries from
1975 to 1987, ranging between 6% and 37% of GDP. Setting ξTR = 0.2 implies a value of
embezzled tax revenues equal to 4.2% of GDP. Given the estimates for developing countries,
we believe that a reasonable range of estimates of rent seeking as a percentage of GDP in
Italy should be between 0.1% and 5%. This implies values for ξTR that vary between 0.05
and 0.25. Results for this sensitivity analysis, presented in the online appendix, show that
24
Figure 6: IRFs of Model with Corruption
2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.5
0
PARTICIPATION RATE
2 4 6 8 10
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
2 4 6 8 10
−3
−2
−1
0
1
INVESTMENT
2 4 6 8 10
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
GROSS REAL INTEREST RATE
2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
CAPITAL
2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
VACANCIES
2 4 6 8 10
−2
0
2
JOBSEEKERS
2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
EMPLOYMENT
2 4 6 8 10
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
WAGE
2 4 6 8 10
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
OUTPUT
2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
ACTIVE INSTRUMENT
 
 
2 4 6 8 10
1
2
3
4
TAX REVENUE
2 4 6 8 10
−15
−10
−5
DEFICIT−TO−GDP RATIO
2 4 6 8 10
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
DEBT−TO−GDP RATIO
2 4 6 8 10
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
SPENDING CUT
LABOR TAX HIKE
25
with the higher the degree of corruption in the economy, the larger the tax hikes needed
for consolidation and therefore the larger the amplification of the observed responses.
4.3. Dynamics in a Model with Tax Evasion
We now move to a model with tax evasion. Here, we incorporate the informal sector
and set the corruption parameter again to zero. Figure 7 presents the responses of the
formal sector and of fiscal variables, and Figure 8 shows the responses in the informal
sector.
To start with, notice that the response of the formal sector is qualitatively similar
to the benchmark model. However, there is an additional channel at play. For the case
of tax hikes, unemployed jobseekers reallocate their labor supply and the intermediate
firms reallocate their labor demand towards the informal sector. Tax hikes provide direct
incentives for jobseekers to search in the informal sector because of the higher tax rates in
the formal sector. At the same time, intermediate firms find it profitable to post vacancies
in the informal sector because of the fall in the informal wage. The fall in investment,
and hence the capital stock, lowers the productivity differential between the two sectors,
and further provides incentives for agents to reallocate to the informal sector. As a result,
shadow employment as a share of total employment increases.
For the case of expenditure cuts, the negative demand effect of the spending cut affects
both formal and informal production, leading to a reduction in labor demand in both
sectors. Similarly, as labor force participation falls, there is a reduction in unemployed
jobseekers in both sectors. This causes a contraction in total employment. Moreover, there
is a reallocation of labor towards the formal sector; shadow employment as a share of total
employment falls, consistent with the evidence we presented in Section 2. This happens
for two reasons. Firstly, the formal labor market has a higher matching efficiency, and a
lower job destruction rate. Secondly, in addition to having a higher TFP level, the rise
in the capital stock further increases the productivity of the formal sector relative to the
informal sector. In order to take advantage of these efficiency gains, and thus mitigate the
negative effects of the fiscal contraction, agents optimally choose to reallocate towards the
formal sector.
4.4. A Model with Tax Evasion and Corruption
In this section we introduce both tax evasion and corruption and, in Figure 9, we
compare the responses of output, the unemployment rate and welfare to the benchmark
model.23
For spending cuts, shown in the top panel, the presence of tax evasion and corruption
generates smaller losses in output, a drop in the unemployment rate at all horizons, and
larger welfare gains. With tax evasion and corruption, the tax adjustments required to
23Welfare is computed as per-period steady state consumption equivalents. IRFs of all other variables
are included in the online appendix.
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Figure 7: IRFs of Model with Tax Evasion
2 4 6 8 10
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
PARTICIPATION RATE
2 4 6 8 10
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
CONSUMPTION
2 4 6 8 10
−2
−1
0
1
2
INVESTMENT
2 4 6 8 10
−0.05
0
0.05
GROSS REAL INTEREST RATE
2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
CAPITAL
2 4 6 8 10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
FORMAL VACANCIES
2 4 6 8 10
−5
0
5
FORMAL JOBSEEKERS
2 4 6 8 10
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
FORMAL EMPLOYMENT
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
FORMAL WAGE
2 4 6 8 10
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
FORMAL OUTPUT
2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
ACTIVE INSTRUMENT
 
 
2 4 6 8 10
1
2
3
4
TAX REVENUE
2 4 6 8 10
−15
−10
−5
DEFICIT−TO−GDP RATIO
2 4 6 8 10
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
DEBT−TO−GDP RATIO
2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
SPENDING CUT
LABOR TAX HIKE
27
Figure 8: IRFs of Model with Tax Evasion - Informal Sector
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Figure 9: Comparison of Benchmark and Full Model
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achieve a given change in deficit are larger, and thus, following a spending cut, taxes in the
future are expected to fall by more. In other words, there is an amplification of the positive
wealth effect. Hence the rise in consumption and the fall in labor force participation are
larger relative to the model without tax evasion and corruption, making welfare gains
larger. The increased crowding-in of private consumption mitigates the negative demand
effect for the firms, thereby mitigating output losses. The larger reduction in labor force
participation implies a fall in the number of formal jobseekers, and hence in the official
unemployment rate, at all horizons.
For tax hikes, shown in the middle panel, the presence of corruption and tax evasion
amplifies the output losses, particularly in the long run. This is due to the loss of tax
revenue from both corruption and tax evasion, implying that larger increases in tax rates are
needed to reduce debt-to-GDP. This increases the distortionary effects of the consolidation,
leading to a larger drop in labor force participation, private consumption and investment.
In addition, the reallocation towards the informal sector increases the inefficiencies due
to the lower productivity in this sector. Thus, there is a larger contraction in the formal
sector, which is also evident in the response of the official unemployment rate: the initial
fall is amplified as jobseekers drop out of the formal sector, and the rise in the long run is
higher as firms post fewer vacancies in this sector. Furthermore, tax hikes lead to welfare
losses. Initially, these losses are lower with tax evasion and corruption, but in the medium
and long run, as consumption falls increasingly, we obtain higher losses.
The bottom panel depicts the responses in the case of a mixed consolidation. Here, we
allow both policy instruments, g and τn, to move simultaneously to reduce the deficit, which
follows the debt-targeting rule. We fix the policy mix such that a fraction a of the reductions
in deficit come from expenditure cuts and (1 − a) from revenue enhancements, and set
a = 0.5. In this case, the responses of consumption and investment are determined by the
competing positive and negative wealth effects from the two instruments, and the presence
of tax evasion and corruption plays an important role in determining this relative strength.
In the benchmark model, the positive wealth effect of the expenditure cut is dominant and
consumption rises for several periods. When there is tax evasion and corruption, this is no
longer true and consumption and investment fall in all periods. Hence, as in the case of
tax hikes, output and unemployment responses are amplified in the presence of tax evasion
and corruption. This is in line with the evidence presented in Section 2. Moreover, the
welfare gains obtained from mixed consolidation packages in the benchmark model turn
into welfare losses in the model with tax evasion and corruption.
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
Both the effects of labor tax hikes and expenditure cuts depend crucially on some mod-
eling assumptions. In this section we present how the implications of fiscal consolidations
change when we modify key assumptions or parameters of the model.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis for Spending Cuts in the Full Model
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4.5.1. Spending Cuts
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution. As we saw, the effects of the spending cuts de-
pend crucially on the size of the wealth effect, which in turn depends on the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. As shown in the first panel of Figure 10, repeating the simu-
lations using lower values for the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, η = 0.5
and η = 0.95, yields qualitatively similar results. Quantitatively, for lower values of η,
the risk aversion of agents is lower and after a spending cut we observe larger increases in
consumption and smaller increases in investment, which dampens the long run expansion
in output, as well as a larger drop in the labor force participation rate, which dampens the
drop in the unemployment rate.
Utility-enhancing Government Spending. Assuming that government expenditures provide
a public good, which is consumed by households, can change the welfare implications of
spending cuts. To illustrate this point, we set α1 = 0.85 and α2 = −0.25, so that private
and public spending are weak complements. The top panel of Figure 10 compares the
results of this case with those obtained with wasteful government spending. In the case of
utility-enhancing expenditures, a spending cut directly reduces the consumption bundle,
and households are forced to offset this fall by further increasing private consumption.
Thus, we see a larger crowding-in of private consumption, which mitigates the output and
unemployment effects of spending cuts. However, the welfare effects are reversed: the drop
in the consumption bundle causes welfare to fall for several periods.
Liquidity Constrained Agents. The presence of liquidity constrained consumers has been
shown to play an important role in determining the response of private consumption to
a government spending cut (see e.g. Gal´ı et al., 2007). To explore how the presence of
liquidity constrained consumers can affect our model, we assume a fraction of rule of thumb
(ROT) household members, which we set equal to 44%, in line with the Italian household
survey reported by Martin and Philippon (2014). As shown in the bottom panel of Figure
10, output and unemployment responses are amplified and welfare gains are mitigated
following a spending cut. The presence of ROT agents reduces the positive wealth effect
that the fiscal contraction generates, which implies a smaller increase in consumption and,
hence, welfare, and a larger contraction in output.
4.5.2. Tax Hikes
The Elasticity of Taxable Income. A large body of the literature, initiated by Feldstein
(1999), has argued that the costs of labor taxes can be summarized by the elasticity of
taxable income with respect to the net of tax share. The magnitude of this elasticity can
therefore yield further insights about the effects of tax hikes in the presence of tax evasion
and corruption. We compute the taxable income elasticity by dividing the cumulative
response of taxable income by the cumulative response of the net tax share, up to the point
that tax rates return to steady state. For the benchmark model, the elasticity of taxable
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income equals 0.23, while incorporating tax evasion and corruption in the analysis almost
doubles this elasticity to 0.42.24 This is not surprising, given that we are allowing workers
to move out of taxable work, in the formal sector, not only by leaving the workforce but
also by working in the informal sector. Data also suggests higher estimates of the taxable
income elasticity in countries with more tax evasion and corruption. For example, Kleven
and Schultz (2014) provide an estimate for Denmark equal to 0.09 for this elasticity and,
using the same methodology, Arrazola et al. (2014) report a taxable income elasticity equal
to 1.5 in Spain.
Of course many of our parameter choices affect the estimated value of the taxable
income elasticity and so, in turn, our conclusions about the effects of tax hikes in a model
with tax evasion and corruption. To investigate this, we first consider the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, η. Smaller values of η imply higher values of the
long run elasticity of taxable income: for η = 0.95 and 0.5, the corresponding elasticities are
0.43 and 0.44, respectively. Accordingly, the higher values of the taxable income elasticity,
implied by the lower η, are associated with higher output and welfare losses, as well as
higher unemployment in the medium and long run, as seen in the top panel of Figure 11.
Next, we use alternative values for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
ϕ. The value of the labor supply elastictity determines the size of the substitution effect
following a tax hike and this, in turn, affects the taxable income elasticity in our model.
Higher values of the labor supply elasticity, meaning lower values of ϕ, are associated with
higher values of the taxable income elasticity, equal to 0.56, 0.36 and 0.34 for ϕ = 0.5, 5
and 8, respectively. Results presented in the second panel of Figure 11 indicate that output
losses and medium and long run unemployment increase with the Frisch elasticity.25
Finally, we consider the effects of a reduction in the ability of workers to reallocate
between the two sectors, in particular by assuming a lower value for the matching efficiency
parameter in the informal sector, µI1 = 0.05 instead of 0.12. This modification reduces the
taxable income elasticity to 0.29, close to the value in the benchmark model, and we see
from the third panel of Figure 11 that the model dynamics also resemble the dynamics
of the benchmark model. This is because reallocation to the informal sector is now more
difficult, implying that the reallocation channel plays a smaller role in the dynamics.
The Detection Probability. In our model, the incentives to tax evade are also affected by
the probability of detection. We investigate the role of the detection probability in the
last panel of Figure 11. A higher detection probability reduces the output, unemployment,
and welfare losses after a consolidation through tax hikes, since the incentives to reallocate
to the informal sector are reduced. However, this effect is mostly seen in the short and
24Our estimates are broadly in line with those presented in recent studies that place the value of this
elasticity in the (0.2, 0.8) range. For a survey of the literature, see Saez et al. (2012).
25Welfare comparisons are more difficult when we change η and ϕ because these parameters have a direct
impact on the relative weight of consumption and leisure in the utility function.
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis for Labor Tax Hikes in the Full Model
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medium run; in the long run, the results are similar for the different values of ρ.26
5. Policy Evaluation
Since the model qualitatively replicates the empirical evidence presented in Section 2,
we employ it to evaluate the effects of consolidation packages implemented in southern
European countries in recent years. We recalibrate the model for Greece, Portugal and
Spain, three countries which are also characterized by high corruption and tax evasion,
and analyze the effects of their recent consolidation packages.
5.1. Calibration
Using the information in OECD (2012), we adjust the size of the consolidation in each
country to match the reduction in the deficit-to-GDP ratio implemented in 2010 and also
replicate the announced consolidation volumes in the long run. Table 5 reports the consoli-
dation in 2010 for each country and the intended consolidation to be implemented by 2015.
We see that Greece implemented the most severe austerity package. The consolidation
package of Italy in 2010 was small, but larger consolidation volumes were announced for
2015. The consolidation packages in Spain and Portugal were similar in 2010, but Portu-
gal announced a slightly larger long run consolidation volume. In order to replicate the
actual consolidation packages, we allow both instruments to move simultaneously, again
using OECD (2012) to fix the relative contribution of the two instruments for each coun-
try. Portugal used more tax hikes than expenditure cuts, while the other countries used
predominantly expenditure-based measures.27
Table 5 also summarizes the differences in the calibration for the various economies. We
use the estimates of shadow output in Elgin and O¨ztunah (2012) to determine the relative
share of shadow employment across countries, which gives comparable numbers, though
slightly higher in Greece. Following the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index, shown
in Figure 1, we set the embezzlement rate in Greece and Italy higher than Spain and Portu-
gal. According to the OECD statistics, Portugal has a notably healthier labor market, with
the highest labor force participation rate and the lowest unemployment rate. According to
the CEP-OECD database and the ICTWSS (Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2011) indices, Italy
and Greece have higher unionisation and coordination of bargaining, reflected in our model
by lower bargaining power for firms, compared to Spain and Portugal. Also, according to
the CEP-OECD database and the estimates in Martin (1996), replacement rates are lower
in Italy and Greece relative to Spain and Portugal. Accordingly in Table 5 we assume
replacement rates of 35% for Italy and Greece and 45% for Portugal and Spain. Spain
26Since the auditing probability affects the reallocation of workers between sectors, it could also affect the
consolidation through spending cuts. However, the results under the alternative values of ρ do not change
substantially compared to the results of the baseline calibration.
27See the tables on p.138, 166, 206, 226 of OECD (2012).
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Table 5: Policy Evaluation: Calibration Values
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Consolidation Volume - 2010 (% GDP) 7.8% 0.9% 2.7% 2.3%
Consolidation Volume - 2015 (% GDP) 18.5% 6.1% 7.3% 12.2%
Expenditure Share in Policy Mix 0.60 0.58 0.66 0.23
Informal Employment (% Total Employment) 14 13 12.5 12.5
Embezzlement Rate 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10
Unemployment Rate 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.07
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.70
Formal Firm’s Bargaining Power 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.32
Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate 35% 35% 45% 45%
Debt (% GDP) 145.0 120.1 61.2 93.3
Government Consumption Spending (% GDP) 5 11 6 5
has the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio, while Greece and Italy both face debt well over 100%
of GDP. Finally, the size of the government consumption expenditure as a percentage of
GDP is higher in Italy than in the other countries.
5.2. Results
The simulation results are shown in Figure 12. Despite the substantial use of expen-
diture cuts, we see that tax evasion increases in all countries. With the use of tax hikes
in the consolidation mix, the direct incentive to produce in the informal sector dominates
the efficiency gains from producing in the formal sector, leading to a reallocation towards
the informal sector. The relative size of the increase across countries is determined by the
relative size of the tax hikes. Note that Portugal experiences the largest long run increase
in the informal economy because of the heavy use of tax hikes in their consolidation.
The model predicts sizeable and persistent output losses following all consolidation
packages. The relative size of these losses across countries reflects the size of the consoli-
dation: Greece exhibits large losses, while in Italy the relatively small adjustment implies
smaller effect. As a result, the unemployment rate increases in the long run in Greece, while
the effects are negligible in Italy. However, note that Portugal experiences the largest out-
put drop in the long run, because of the large share of tax hikes in the consolidation mix.
Accordingly, Spain experiences much smaller output losses, despite the similar size of the
consolidation package. Nonetheless, given the higher efficiency of labor markets in Por-
tugal, these two countries experience similar unemployment outcomes. Finally, the fiscal
consolidations induce welfare losses in all countries. Both the size of the consolidation
and the composition of the package determines the magnitude of the losses. In particular,
Italy experiences the lowest welfare losses, given the small consolidation, whilst Portugal
experiences higher welfare losses than Greece due to the large use of tax hikes.
5.3. Counterfactual Analysis
The austerity packages implemented in recent years have sparked a debate about the
need to fight tax evasion and corruption. It is therefore interesting to ask whether reforms
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Figure 12: Cross-country Comparison of Fiscal Consolidation Plans
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Figure 13: Welfare Effects of Fiscal Consolidation Plans: Counterfactual Analysis
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aimed at reducing tax evasion and corruption may change the effects of the current con-
solidation plans. To investigate the issue, we carry out two counterfactual experiments:
we simulate the fiscal consolidation plans first assuming that the tax auditing probabil-
ity is doubled, and then assuming that the embezzlement rate is reduced by half. Figure
13 reports the welfare responses in the baseline calibration, in the case when the auditing
probability is higher, and in the case when the embezzlement rate is lower, for each country.
We find that welfare losses would be mitigated by the reforms. Reducing tax evasion and
corruption implies that the deficit reductions are achieved with lower hikes in the tax rate.
With the reduction in tax evasion, there is a sizeable reduction in welfare losses in Italy and
Portugal, and short run welfare gains for Greece and Spain, which have relatively more
expenditure-based consolidation policies. When corruption is reduced, welfare improves
substantially in Italy, and in Greece on impact, since these two countries have a higher
degree of corruption. In Spain and Portugal, where the level of corruption is lower, the
gains from reducing corruption are small relative to fighting tax evasion.
6. Conclusions
Empirical evidence indicates that accounting for tax evasion and corruption is key for
understanding the effects of fiscal consolidation. A New Keynesian DSGE model with
involuntary unemployment, an informal sector and public corruption, demonstrates that
these two features amplify the contractionary effects of labor tax hikes, while they mitigate
the effects of expenditure cuts. It also shows that the instrument used to achieve fiscal
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consolidation affects the incentives of agents to produce in the informal sector. Consistent
with VAR evidence obtained for Italian, spending cuts reduce the size of the informal
economy, while tax hikes increase it.
Given the model’s ability to reproduce the qualitative features of the data, we ana-
lyze how current fiscal consolidation plans in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain affect tax
evasion, output, unemployment and welfare. The model predicts increasing levels of tax
evasion during the consolidation in all countries, and prolonged output and welfare losses.
Greece suffers heavy losses due to the severity of the austerity package implemented; Por-
tugal experiences the largest drops in output and welfare because of the heavy use of tax
hikes in their consolidation package. Furthermore, the welfare costs of these consolidations
would have been smaller if tax evasion and corruption had been reduced. Hence, reforms
aimed at fighting public corruption and tax evasion should go hand-in-hand with austerity
measures in order to mitigate the welfare costs of fiscal consolidations.
Our exercise is the first attempt to analyze the effects of fiscal consolidation in the
presence of tax evasion and corruption. Since the model is stylized, it leaves out important
aspects of reality that could affect our conclusions. For example, in our economy there is a
representative household, and so we cannot assess the effects of tax evasion and corruption
on income inequality. Also, we consider only cuts in government consumption expenditures
and not in other items of the government budget. Furthermore, our model does not allow
for evasion of consumption taxes, which is an important component of tax evasion in
southern European countries. Finally, the model treats the degree of public corruption as
a parameter, which does not allow it to respond to cyclical factors or to interact with tax
evasion. We leave these extensions for future research.
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